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HILBERT’S FIRST AND SECOND PROBLEMS AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS
PETER NYIKOS
In , David Hilbert gave a seminal lecture in which he spoke about
a list of unsolved problems in mathematics that he deemed to be of out-
standing importance. The first of these was Cantor’s continuum problem,
which has to do with infinite numbers with which Cantor revolutionised set
theory. The smallest infinite number, ℵ0, ‘aleph-nought,’ gives the number
of positive whole numbers. A set is of this cardinality if it is possible to
list its members in an arrangement such that each one is encountered after
a finite number (however large) of steps. Cantor’s revolutionary discovery
was that the points on a line cannot be so listed, and so the number of
points on a line is a strictly higher infinite number (c, ‘the cardinality of
the continuum’) than ℵ0. Hilbert’s First Problem asks whether any infinite
subset of the real line is of one of these two cardinalities. The axiom that
this is indeed the case is known as the Continuum Hypothesis (CH).
This problem had unexpected connections with Hilbert’s Second Problem
(and even with the Tenth, see the article by M. Davis and the comments on
the book edited by F. Browder). The Second Problem asked for a proof
of the consistency of the foundations of mathematics. Some of the flavor of
the urgency of that problem is provided by the following passage from an
article by S.G. Simpson in the same volume of JSL as the article by P.
Maddy:
We must remember that in Hilbert’s time, all mathemati-
cians were excited about the foundations of mathematics.
Intense controversy centered around the problem of the le-
gitimacy of abstract objects. Weierstrass had greatly clari-
fied the role of the infinite in calculus. Cantor’s set theory
promised to raise mathematics to new heights of generality,
clarity and rigor. But Frege’s attempt to base mathemat-
ics on a general theory of properties led to an embarrass-
ing contradiction. Great mathematicians such as Kronecker,
Poincare´, and Brouwer challenged the validity of all infini-
tistic reasoning. Hilbert vowed to defend the Cantorian par-
adise. The fires of controversy were fueled by revolutionary
developments in mathematical physics. There was a stormy
This article is adapted from a one-hour colloquium lecture given at the University
of Auckland in May, 2000, just three months before the 100th anniversary of Hilbert’s
lecture.
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climate of debate and criticism. The contrast with today’s
climate of intellectual exhaustion and compartmentalization
could not be more striking.
. . . Actually, Hilbert saw the issue as having supramathe-
matical significance. Mathematics is not only the most logi-
cal and rigorous of the sciences but also the most spectacular
example of the power of “unaided” human reason. If math-
ematics fails, then so does the human spirit. I was deeply
moved by the following passage [13, pp. 370–371]: “The de-
finitive clarification of the nature of the infinite has become
necessary, not merely for the special interests of the indi-
vidual sciences but for the honor of human understanding
itself.”
Hilbert was already aware, at the time of his  lecture, of some con-
nection between the provability of the consistency of a mathematical theory
and the decidability of statements by the axioms of the theory. But it was
Kurt Go¨del who showed the true nature of this connection in the process of
showing that Hilbert’s Second Problem has a negative solution:
The First Incompleteness Theorem. Every recursively axiomatizable
theory rich enough to include the Peano Axioms contains statements whose
truth cannot be decided within the theory. In particular, Peano Arithmetic
itself can be used to formulate true statements about the natural numbers
that are not provable within Peano Arithmetic.
[Query: Is Fermat’s Last Theorem one of these statements? Wiles has
shown it follows from the usual ZFC axioms; but does it already follow from
the Peano axioms?]
The Second Incompleteness Theorem. Every recursively axiomatizable
theory rich enough to include the Peano Axioms is incapable of demonstrat-
ing its own consistency.
Another fundamental discovery of Go¨del was:
The Completeness Theorem. Every consistent set of axioms has a model.
Together with the first incompleteness theorem, this has been a source of a
wealth of mathematics as well as such paradoxical facts as the following: it is
impossible to unambiguously formalize the distinction between “finite” and
“infinite”. The “featherless biped” definition of an infinite set as one that
can be put into one-to-one correspondence with a proper subset of itself does
not work; neither does the more natural definition of a finite set as one that
can be put into one-to-one correspondence with {0, . . . , n} for some natural
number n: the very concept of “natural number” cannot be formalized in
a way that makes it clear that our intuitive concept of a natural number is
intended.
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God¨el [1940] also gave a partial solution to Hilbert’s First Problem by
showing that the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) is consistent if the usual
Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) axioms for set theory are consistent. He produced
a model, known as the Constructible Universe, of the ZF axioms in which
both the Axiom of Choice (AC) and the CH hold. Then Cohen showed in
 that the negations of these axioms are also consistent with ZF; in par-
ticular, CH can fail while AC holds in a model of ZF. Cohen’s technique
for producing such models was generalized by Scott, Solovay, and Shoenfeld
and a huge variety of models of ZFC (ZF plus AC) has been produced in
the years since then, affecting many areas of mathematics. The books by
Dales and Woodin, Fremlin, Kunen, Kunen and Vaughan, Monk,
and Rudin as well as the articles by Eklof and Roitman, and the articles
of Blass reviewed by Nyikos give some idea of how great a variety of topics
these independence results have been relevant to.
Topology has been affected perhaps more than any other field, and the
following gives a small sample. Recall the Heine-Borel theorem: Every open
cover of a closed bounded subset of the real line has a finite subcover. The
conclusion provides also the definition of A compact topological space. The
conclusion of another famous topological theorem, the Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem, is the basis for a weaker concept:
Definition. A topological space is countably compact if every infinite subset
has an accumulation point.
A strengthening of countable compactness, not shared by all compact
spaces, is that of sequential compactness: every sequence has a convergent
subsequence.
These three concepts agree for all metrizable spaces (those spaces whose
topology is given by a distance function to the non-negative reals that is
symmetric, puts distinct points at a positive distance from each other, and
satisfies the triangle inequality). Compact metrizable spaces have lots of
other properties not shared by compact topological spaces in general, so it
is perhaps surprising that the question of when a compact space is metrizable
can be very simply settled:
Theorem (Sneider, 1945). A compact space is metrizable if, and only if, it
is Hausdorff and has a Gδ-diagonal; that is, the diagonal {(x, x) : x ∈ X} is
a countable intersection of open sets.
This theorem was extended to all regular countably compact spaces by
J. Chaber in . One might naturally expect these two theorems to either
stand or fall together if “Gδ-diagonal” is weakened to “small diagonal”:
Definition. A space has a small diagonal if, whenever A is an uncountable
subset of X×X that is disjoint from the diagonal ∆, there is a neighborhood
U of ∆ such that U \A is uncountable.
But in fact, this is not the case. On the one hand, we know that CH
implies every compact Hausdorff space with a small diagonal is metrizable.
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We do not know whether ZFC implies this as well; but, be that as it may,
the corresponding statement about regular countably compact spaces is in-
dependent not only of ZFC, but also of CH. On the one hand, Gary Gruen-
hage has shown that in a model of CH constructed by Todd Eisworth and
Peter Nyikos, the statement is true—every countably compact regular space
with a small diagonal is metrizable; on the other hand, Oleg Pavlov has
constructed a counterexample in Go¨del’s Constructible Universe, the very
model that originally established the consistency of CH!
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